FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has primarily targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities industries in the U.S. A portion of FIN7 was run out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but there appears to be several groups using Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| GOLD NIAGARA | |
| ITG14 | |
| Carbon Spider | |
| ELBRUS | |
| Sangria Tempest |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows管理规范 |
FIN7 has used WMI to install malware on targeted systems.[11] |
|
| Enterprise | T1546 | .011 | 事件触发执行: Application Shimming |
FIN7 has used application shim databases for persistence.[12] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | 从本地系统获取数据 |
FIN7 has collected files and other sensitive information from a compromised network.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service |
FIN7 has created a scheduled task named "AdobeFlashSync" to establish persistence.[13] |
| .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
FIN7 has attempted to run Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe.[5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1195 | .002 | 供应链破坏: Compromise Software Supply Chain |
FIN7 has gained initial access by compromising a victim's software supply chain.[6] |
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service |
FIN7 created new Windows services and added them to the startup directories for persistence.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | 利用公开应用程序漏洞 |
FIN7 has compromised targeted organizations through exploitation of CVE-2021-31207 in Exchange.[9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[2][4] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | 命令与脚本解释器 |
FIN7 used SQL scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14][4] |
|
| .001 | PowerShell |
FIN7 used a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieved an additional payload.[2][13][15][6] |
||
| .003 | Windows Command Shell |
FIN7 used the command prompt to launch commands on the victim’s machine.[4][14][6] |
||
| .005 | Visual Basic |
FIN7 used VBS scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14][5] |
||
| .007 | JavaScript |
FIN7 used JavaScript scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.[4][14][4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1008 | 回退信道 |
FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.[16] |
|
| Enterprise | T1113 | 屏幕捕获 | ||
| Enterprise | T1071 | .004 | 应用层协议: DNS |
FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | 开发能力: Malware |
FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media.[15][18] |
| Enterprise | T1486 | 数据加密以实现影响 |
FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.[5][6] |
|
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | 暂存能力: Upload Malware |
FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3.[6] |
| .004 | 暂存能力: Drive-by Target |
FIN7 has compromised a digital product website and modified multiple download links to point to trojanized versions of offered digital products.[6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1078 | 有效账户 |
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[5] |
|
| .003 | Local Accounts |
FIN7 has used compromised credentials for access as SYSTEM on Exchange servers.[9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1069 | .002 | 权限组发现: Domain Groups |
FIN7 has used the command |
| Enterprise | T1027 | .001 | 混淆文件或信息: Binary Padding |
FIN7 has used random junk code to obfuscate malware code.[6] |
| .010 | 混淆文件或信息: Command Obfuscation |
FIN7 has used fragmented strings, environment variables, standard input (stdin), and native character-replacement functionalities to obfuscate commands.[19][4][5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | 用户执行: Malicious Link |
FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.[5] |
| .002 | 用户执行: Malicious File |
FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file.[2][11][5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1558 | .003 | 窃取或伪造Kerberos票据: Kerberoasting |
FIN7 has used Kerberoasting PowerShell commands such as, |
| Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | 系统二进制代理执行: Mshta |
FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.[2] |
| .011 | 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32 |
FIN7 has used |
||
| Enterprise | T1033 | 系统所有者/用户发现 |
FIN7 has used the command |
|
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | 网络服务: Bidirectional Communication |
FIN7 used legitimate services like Google Docs, Google Scripts, and Pastebin for C2.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | 获取基础设施: Domains |
FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns.[11] |
| .006 | 获取基础设施: Web Services |
FIN7 has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products.[6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | 获取能力: Tool |
FIN7 has utilized a variety of tools such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, and the remote management tool, Atera for targeting efforts.[6] |
| Enterprise | T1497 | .002 | 虚拟化/沙盒规避: User Activity Based Checks |
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1125 | 视频捕获 |
FIN7 created a custom video recording capability that could be used to monitor operations in the victim's environment.[4][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
FIN7 has downloaded additional malware to execute on the victim's machine, including by using a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieves an additional payload.[2][17][6] |
|
| Enterprise | T1559 | .002 | 进程间通信: Dynamic Data Exchange |
FIN7 spear phishing campaigns have included malicious Word documents with DDE execution.[20] |
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol |
FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.[5] |
| .004 | 远程服务: SSH |
FIN7 has used SSH to move laterally through victim environments.[5] |
||
| .005 | 远程服务: VNC | |||
| Enterprise | T1210 | 远程服务漏洞利用 |
FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1219 | 远程访问软件 |
FIN7 has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.[6] |
|
| Enterprise | T1091 | 通过可移动媒体复制 |
FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | 通过网络服务渗出: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.[5] |
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Attachment |
FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.[2][17][14][11][5] |
| .002 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links.[5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1571 | 非标准端口 |
FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task |
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[2][13][4][14] |
| Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | 颠覆信任控制: Code Signing |
FIN7 has signed Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.[3][4] |