浏览器信息发现是攻击者通过提取浏览器存储的用户数据(如书签、历史记录、自动填充凭证)进行情报收集的技术,旨在获取用户行为特征、内部系统访问记录等敏感信息。传统检测手段主要通过监控浏览器进程的异常文件访问行为(如读取Login Data数据库)、检测未经授权的API调用,或分析可疑的远程调试会话。防御方通常结合浏览器沙箱机制、内存保护技术和云同步日志审计进行防护。
为规避传统检测机制,攻击者发展出新型隐蔽信息获取技术,通过功能寄生、空间转移和接口滥用等策略,将数据收集行为深度融入浏览器正常业务逻辑,显著降低操作行为的异常性特征。
现有浏览器信息发现匿迹技术的核心逻辑在于攻击路径的合法化重构与数据流的非侵入式获取。浏览器扩展注入发现利用数字签名信任链,将恶意模块嵌入合法扩展更新流程,实现"权限白利用";云同步数据劫持通过攻击链空间转移至云端,利用标准化API接口规避终端检测;内存残留信息提取突破传统文件监控维度,在易失性存储层构建无痕攻击通道;合法API滥用则完全遵循浏览器设计规范,通过协议级伪装实现攻击行为合法化。四类技术的共性在于突破传统攻击面的物理边界,通过浏览器生态的信任传递机制与系统接口的合规调用,将恶意操作转化为授权行为,使得基于行为特征或静态规则的检测体系难以生效。
匿迹技术的演进导致传统终端行为监控和文件审计机制防护效能下降,防御方需加强浏览器进程内存保护、扩展供应链安全检测,并构建云地协同的异常API调用分析体系,通过用户行为基线建模识别隐蔽数据收集行为。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ✅ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ❌ |
攻击者通过滥用浏览器合法接口(如调试协议、管理API)和数字签名扩展程序,使数据收集行为在协议特征、进程行为层面与正常操作完全一致。例如利用Chrome DevTools Protocol获取Cookies时,网络流量特征与开发者工具调试会话无异,实现攻击行为的深度伪装。
内存残留提取技术通过直接读取进程内存空间获取解密后的敏感数据,绕过浏览器文件加密存储机制。由于不触发文件系统操作且利用系统合法API,传统基于文件访问日志或加密机制的安全防护无法感知攻击行为。
云同步数据劫持技术通过HTTPS加密通道传输窃取的浏览器数据,并利用云端服务的数据加密机制实现二次遮蔽。防御方既无法解析加密流量内容,也难以通过终端日志追溯数据泄露路径。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0082 | APT38 |
APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[1] |
| S0274 | Calisto |
Calisto collects information on bookmarks from Google Chrome.[2] |
| G0114 | Chimera |
Chimera has used |
| S1153 | Cuckoo Stealer |
Cuckoo Stealer can collect bookmarks, cookies, and history from Safari.[4] |
| S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman can retrieve browser history.[5] |
| S0567 | Dtrack | |
| S0363 | Empire |
Empire has the ability to gather browser data such as bookmarks and visited sites.[8] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used Google Chrome bookmarks to identify internal resources and assets.[9] |
| S0681 | Lizar |
Lizar can retrieve browser history and database files.[10][11] |
| S0409 | Machete |
Machete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.[12] |
| S1060 | Mafalda |
Mafalda can collect the contents of the |
| S1122 | Mispadu |
Mispadu can monitor browser activity for online banking actions and display full-screen overlay images to block user access to the intended site or present additional data fields.[14][15] |
| S0079 | MobileOrder |
MobileOrder has a command to upload to its C2 server victim browser bookmarks.[16] |
| G1036 | Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet deployed malware such as YouieLoader capable of capturing victim system browser information.[17] |
| S1012 | PowerLess |
PowerLess has a browser info stealer module that can read Chrome and Edge browser database files.[18] |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider |
Scattered Spider retrieves browser histories via infostealer malware such as Raccoon Stealer.[19] |
| S1042 | SUGARDUMP |
SUGARDUMP has collected browser bookmark and history information.[20] |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has targeted the browsing history of network administrators.[21] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser information, such as local files and databases (e.g., |
| DS0022 | File | File Access |
Monitor for unusual access to stored browser data, such as local files and databases (e.g., |
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor for processes with arguments that may be associated with gathering browser information, such as local files and databases (e.g., |