网络服务滥用指攻击者利用合法云服务、社交平台等Web服务作为命令控制或数据传输通道,通过协议模拟、加密通信等方式隐藏恶意活动。传统防御手段聚焦于检测异常API调用模式、识别加密流量中的元数据特征,以及监控用户行为异常。缓解措施包括实施SSL/TLS解密审查、建立网络流量基线模型,以及分析客户端与服务端的数据传输不对称性。
为规避传统检测机制,攻击者逐步发展出基于云原生架构的隐蔽通信技术,通过深度整合Web服务生态特性与攻击链需求,构建出多层匿迹防护体系。这些技术突破单点对抗模式,将恶意行为无缝嵌入云服务业务流,形成"服务即武器"的新型攻击范式。
当前网络服务匿迹技术的共性特征体现为服务生态的武器化改造与协议语义的对抗性重构。攻击者通过协议逆向工程将恶意功能映射至合法服务接口,例如将C2指令编码为API参数、利用云存储事件驱动机制实现异步通信。动态拓扑切换则依托云服务的弹性架构,构建出时变通信矩阵。这些技术均注重利用服务提供商的基础设施优势,例如全球CDN加速、自动扩容机制、跨区域冗余存储等,将攻击流量深度隐藏在服务提供商的运维体系之中,迫使防御方必须穿透多层服务抽象才能实施有效检测。
匿迹技术的演进使得传统基于流量特征或端点行为的检测方法面临严峻挑战。防御体系需向服务语义理解方向升级,构建跨云平台的元数据关联分析能力,开发基于服务上下文的行为异常检测模型,并建立与云服务提供商的安全数据共享机制,实现对滥用行为的全景式监控。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ✅ |
攻击者通过精确模拟目标云服务的API交互模式,将恶意通信流量伪装成合法的业务请求。例如使用标准OAuth 2.0令牌进行身份认证,严格遵循RESTful API设计规范,使得恶意流量在协议结构和交互流程上与正常业务流量完全一致,有效规避基于协议合规性检查的防御机制。
普遍采用传输层加密(TLS 1.3)与应用层加密(如云服务客户端加密)的双重加密机制,同时利用云服务商提供的密钥管理体系隐藏加密密钥。部分技术进一步实施数据分片存储与跨区域冗余,确保单一节点被查获时无法还原完整数据。
通过动态拓扑切换,将攻击流量分散到多个地理区域和时区。利用云服务的自动伸缩特性实现通信节奏的动态调整,使攻击行为的时间分布与目标组织的业务周期保持同步,显著降低异常时间窗口的检测可能性。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 has used Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.[1] |
| C0040 | APT41 DUST |
APT41 DUST used compromised Google Workspace accounts for command and control.[2] |
| S1081 | BADHATCH |
BADHATCH can be utilized to abuse |
| S0534 | Bazar | |
| S0635 | BoomBox |
BoomBox can download files from Dropbox using a hardcoded access token.[6] |
| S1063 | Brute Ratel C4 |
Brute Ratel C4 can use legitimate websites for external C2 channels including Slack, Discord, and MS Teams.[7] |
| S1039 | Bumblebee |
Bumblebee has been downloaded to victim's machines from OneDrive.[8] |
| C0017 | C0017 |
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.[9] |
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee.[10] |
| S0335 | Carbon | |
| S0674 | CharmPower |
CharmPower can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets.[12] |
| S1149 | CHIMNEYSWEEP |
CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to use use Telegram channels to return a list of commands to be executed, to download additional payloads, or to create a reverse shell.[13] |
| S1066 | DarkTortilla |
DarkTortilla can retrieve its primary payload from public sites such as Pastebin and Textbin.[14] |
| S0600 | Doki |
Doki has used the dogechain.info API to generate a C2 address.[15] |
| S0547 | DropBook |
DropBook can communicate with its operators by exploiting the Simplenote, DropBox, and the social media platform, Facebook, where it can create fake accounts to control the backdoor and receive instructions.[16][17] |
| G1011 | EXOTIC LILY |
EXOTIC LILY has used file-sharing services including WeTransfer, TransferNow, and OneDrive to deliver payloads.[18] |
| G0037 | FIN6 |
FIN6 has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations.[19] |
| G0061 | FIN8 |
FIN8 has used |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.[21] |
| G0047 | Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group has used GitHub repositories for downloaders which will be obtained by the group's .NET executable on the compromised system.[22] |
| S0561 | GuLoader |
GuLoader has the ability to download malware from Google Drive.[23] |
| S0601 | Hildegard | |
| G0100 | Inception |
Inception has incorporated at least five different cloud service providers into their C2 infrastructure including CloudMe.[25][26] |
| S1160 | Latrodectus |
Latrodectus has used Google Firebase to download malicious installation scripts.[27] |
| G0140 | LazyScripter |
LazyScripter has used GitHub to host its payloads to operate spam campaigns.[28] |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of PlugX.[29] |
| S0198 | NETWIRE |
NETWIRE has used web services including Paste.ee to host payloads.[30] |
| S0508 | ngrok |
ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.[31] |
| S1147 | Nightdoor |
Nightdoor can utilize Microsoft OneDrive or Google Drive for command and control purposes.[32][33] |
| C0005 | Operation Spalax |
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.[34] |
| S1130 | Raspberry Robin |
Raspberry Robin second stage payloads can be hosted as RAR files, containing a malicious EXE and DLL, on Discord servers.[35] |
| G1039 | RedCurl |
RedCurl has used web services to download malicious files.[36][37] |
| G0106 | Rocke |
Rocke has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.[38][39] |
| S0546 | SharpStage |
SharpStage has used a legitimate web service for evading detection.[16] |
| S0589 | Sibot |
Sibot has used a legitimate compromised website to download DLLs to the victim's machine.[40] |
| S0649 | SMOKEDHAM |
SMOKEDHAM has used Google Drive and Dropbox to host files downloaded by victims via malicious links.[41] |
| S1086 | Snip3 |
Snip3 can download additional payloads from web services including Pastebin and top4top.[42] |
| S1124 | SocGholish |
SocGholish has used Amazon Web Services to host second-stage servers.[43] |
| G0139 | TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.[44][45] |
| G0010 | Turla |
Turla has used legitimate web services including Pastebin, Dropbox, and GitHub for C2 communications.[11][46] |
| S0689 | WhisperGate |
WhisperGate can download additional payloads hosted on a Discord channel.[47][48][49][50][51] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
| M1021 | Restrict Web-Based Content |
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Connection Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
| Network Traffic Content |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
| Network Traffic Flow |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |