C0027

C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.[1]

ID: C0027
First Seen:  June 2022 [1]
Last Seen:  December 2022 [1]
Version: 1.0
Created: 30 June 2023
Last Modified: 05 July 2023

Groups

ID Name Description
G1015 Scattered Spider

[1]

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1047 Windows管理规范

During C0027, Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.[1]

Enterprise T1530 从云存储获取数据

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim OneDrive environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.[1]

Enterprise T1213 .002 从信息存储库获取数据: Sharepoint

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim SharePoint environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.[1]

Enterprise T1090 代理

During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance.[1]

Enterprise T1656 伪装

During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls and text messages either to direct victims to a credential harvesting site or getting victims to run commercial remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.[1]

Enterprise T1598 .001 信息钓鱼: Spearphishing Service

During C0027, Scattered Spider sent Telegram messages impersonating IT personnel to harvest credentials.[1]

.004 信息钓鱼: Spearphishing Voice

During C0027, Scattered Spider used phone calls to instruct victims to navigate to credential-harvesting websites.[1]

Enterprise T1578 .002 修改云计算基础设施: Create Cloud Instance

During C0027, Scattered Spider used access to the victim's Azure tenant to create Azure VMs.[1]

Enterprise T1190 利用公开应用程序漏洞

During C0027, Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2021-35464 in the ForgeRock Open Access Management (OpenAM) application server to gain initial access.[1]

Enterprise T1572 协议隧道

During C0027, Scattered Spider used SSH tunneling in targeted environments.[1]

Enterprise T1133 外部远程服务

During C0027, Scattered Spider used Citrix and VPNs to persist in compromised environments.[1]

Enterprise T1621 多因素身份验证请求生成

During C0027, Scattered Spider attempted to gain access by continuously sending MFA messages to the victim until they accept the MFA push challenge.[1]

Enterprise T1003 .006 操作系统凭证转储: DCSync

During C0027, Scattered Spider performed domain replication.[1]

Enterprise T1589 .001 收集受害者身份信息: Credentials

During C0027, Scattered Spider sent phishing messages via SMS to steal credentials.[1]

Enterprise T1078 .004 有效账户: Cloud Accounts

During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants.[1]

Enterprise T1069 .003 权限组发现: Cloud Groups

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes.[1]

Enterprise T1102 网络服务

During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee.[1]

Enterprise T1046 网络服务发现

During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances.[1]

Enterprise T1588 .002 获取能力: Tool

During C0027, Scattered Spider obtained and used multiple tools including the LINpeas privilege escalation utility, aws_consoler, rsocx reverse proxy, Level RMM tool, and RustScan port scanner.[1]

Enterprise T1087 .003 账号发现: Email Account

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses.[1]

.004 账号发现: Cloud Account

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes.[1]

Enterprise T1098 .001 账号操控: Additional Cloud Credentials

During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.[1]

.003 账号操控: Additional Cloud Roles

During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges.[1]

.005 账号操控: Device Registration

During C0027, Scattered Spider registered devices for MFA to maintain persistence through victims' VPN.[1]

Enterprise T1105 输入工具传输

During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools using victim organization systems.[1]

Enterprise T1021 .007 远程服务: Cloud Services

During C0027, Scattered Spider used compromised Azure credentials for credential theft activity and lateral movement to on-premises systems.[1]

Enterprise T1219 远程访问软件

During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.[1]

Enterprise T1566 .004 钓鱼: Spearphishing Voice

During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls to direct victims to download a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool that would allow the adversary to remotely control their system.[1]

Software

ID Name Description
S0357 Impacket

During C0027, Scattered Spider used Impacket for lateral movement.[1]

References