代理技术是攻击者通过中间系统转发网络流量以隐藏真实源头或规避网络限制的战术手段,常用于命令控制、数据渗漏等场景。传统代理技术依赖VPN、SOCKS等标准协议,可通过检测非常用端口通信、分析协议合规性、识别节点地理位置异常等方法进行防御。现代防御体系通常结合流量指纹分析、TLS证书验证和节点信誉评估等机制识别恶意代理行为。
为突破传统检测机制的约束,攻击者发展出深度隐匿的新型代理技术,通过暗网架构深度渗透、云服务信任滥用、协议栈仿真等手段,构建出具有环境自适应能力的动态代理体系,实现恶意流量的"合法化"改造。
当前代理匿迹技术的演进呈现三大趋势:信任体系寄生、协议深度仿真和拓扑动态变异。多层暗网代理链通过构建非对称加密路由网络,在实现流量匿名化的同时,利用暗网生态的自治特性抵御节点测绘;合法云服务滥用技术将恶意代理节点嵌入商业云基础设施,借助云服务商的可信背书突破基于IP信誉的检测规则;协议隧道化代理则突破传统应用层隐匿范畴,在网络协议栈各层实施动态伪装,实现与目标网络环境的深度兼容。三类技术的共性在于突破传统网络边界的对抗模式,通过将代理节点融入合法网络生态、匹配目标协议特征分布、实施动态拓扑调整等策略,构建出具备环境感知能力的自适应代理系统。
匿迹技术的发展导致传统基于协议特征匹配、节点黑名单的检测方法逐渐失效,防御方需构建协议行为建模、云服务异常使用检测、暗网流量感知等新型能力,结合网络流量全要素关联分析,实现对隐蔽代理流量的精准识别与阻断。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ✅ |
攻击者通过深度协议模拟和云服务身份冒用,将代理流量特征与合法网络行为对齐。例如将C2通信封装在标准视频流协议中,或利用云服务API网关的合法数字证书,使代理流量在协议指纹、证书链等维度呈现合规特征,规避基于协议异常性的检测。
采用多层加密体系对代理流量实施端到端保护,包括传输层(TLS 1.3)、应用层(自定义加密协议)及元数据层(流量特征混淆)。加密机制不仅保护通信内容,还通过密钥轮换和加密参数动态变化,阻止流量指纹的长期有效性。
通过全球化节点网络和动态路由机制,将代理流量分散在多个时区与自治系统。利用云服务弹性IP池实现每分钟数千次源地址切换,结合区块链技术实现节点关系的动态解耦,使得单次通信行为在时空维度缺乏可关联性,传统基于流量聚合分析的检测方法难以奏效。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications.[1] |
| S0456 | Aria-body |
Aria-body has the ability to use a reverse SOCKS proxy module.[2] |
| S0347 | AuditCred | |
| S0245 | BADCALL |
BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server.[4] |
| S1081 | BADHATCH |
BADHATCH can use SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 proxies to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers. BADHATCH can also emulate a reverse proxy on a compromised machine to connect with actor-controlled C2 servers.[5] |
| S0268 | Bisonal | |
| G0108 | Blue Mockingbird |
Blue Mockingbird has used FRP, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.[7] |
| C0017 | C0017 |
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.[8] |
| C0027 | C0027 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance.[9] |
| S0348 | Cardinal RAT |
Cardinal RAT can act as a reverse proxy.[10] |
| G1021 | Cinnamon Tempest |
Cinnamon Tempest has used a customized version of the Iox port-forwarding and proxy tool.[11] |
| G0052 | CopyKittens |
CopyKittens has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[12] |
| S0384 | Dridex |
Dridex contains a backconnect module for tunneling network traffic through a victim's computer. Infected computers become part of a P2P botnet that can relay C2 traffic to other infected peers.[13][14] |
| G1006 | Earth Lusca |
Earth Lusca adopted Cloudflare as a proxy for compromised servers.[15] |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten |
Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.[16][17][18] |
| S1144 | FRP |
FRP can proxy communications through a server in public IP space to local servers located behind a NAT or firewall.[19] |
| S1044 | FunnyDream |
FunnyDream can identify and use configured proxies in a compromised network for C2 communication.[20] |
| S0690 | Green Lambert |
Green Lambert can use proxies for C2 traffic.[21][22] |
| S0246 | HARDRAIN |
HARDRAIN uses the command |
| S0376 | HOPLIGHT |
HOPLIGHT has multiple proxy options that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators.[24] |
| S0040 | HTRAN |
HTRAN can proxy TCP socket connections to obfuscate command and control infrastructure.[25][26] |
| S0283 | jRAT | |
| S0487 | Kessel |
Kessel can use a proxy during exfiltration if set in the configuration.[28] |
| S1051 | KEYPLUG |
KEYPLUG has used Cloudflare CDN associated infrastructure to redirect C2 communications to malicious domains.[8] |
| S0669 | KOCTOPUS |
KOCTOPUS has deployed a modified version of Invoke-Ngrok to expose open local ports to the Internet.[29] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has leverage NordVPN for its egress points when targeting intended victims.[30] |
| S1121 | LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA |
LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA has the ability to function as a SOCKS proxy.[31] |
| S1141 | LunarWeb |
LunarWeb has the ability to use a HTTP proxy server for C&C communications.[32] |
| G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.[33] |
| G1019 | MoustachedBouncer |
MoustachedBouncer has used a reverse proxy tool similar to the GitHub repository revsocks.[34] |
| S0108 | netsh |
netsh can be used to set up a proxy tunnel to allow remote host access to an infected host.[35] |
| S0198 | NETWIRE | |
| S0508 | ngrok |
ngrok can be used to proxy connections to machines located behind NAT or firewalls.[37][38] |
| C0013 | Operation Sharpshooter |
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the ExpressVPN service to hide their location.[39] |
| C0014 | Operation Wocao |
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops.[40] |
| S0435 | PLEAD | |
| G1005 | POLONIUM |
POLONIUM has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[12] |
| S0378 | PoshC2 |
PoshC2 contains modules that allow for use of proxies in command and control.[42] |
| S0262 | QuasarRAT |
QuasarRAT can communicate over a reverse proxy using SOCKS5.[43][44] |
| S0629 | RainyDay |
RainyDay can use proxy tools including boost_proxy_client for reverse proxy functionality.[45] |
| S0332 | Remcos |
Remcos uses the infected hosts as SOCKS5 proxies to allow for tunneling and proxying.[46] |
| S1099 | Samurai |
Samurai has the ability to proxy connections to specified remote IPs and ports through a a proxy module.[47] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.[48] |
| S0461 | SDBbot |
SDBbot has the ability to use port forwarding to establish a proxy between a target host and C2.[49] |
| S0273 | Socksbot | |
| S0615 | SombRAT |
SombRAT has the ability to use an embedded SOCKS proxy in C2 communications.[51] |
| S0436 | TSCookie |
TSCookie has the ability to proxy communications with command and control (C2) servers.[52] |
| G0010 | Turla |
Turla RPC backdoors have included local UPnP RPC proxies.[53] |
| S0263 | TYPEFRAME |
A TYPEFRAME variant can force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.[54] |
| S0386 | Ursnif |
Ursnif has used a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for C2.[55][56] |
| S0207 | Vasport | |
| G1017 | Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used compromised devices and customized versions of open source tools such as FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy), Earthworm, and Impacket to proxy network traffic.[58][59][60] |
| S0670 | WarzoneRAT |
WarzoneRAT has the capability to act as a reverse proxy.[61] |
| G0124 | Windigo |
Windigo has delivered a generic Windows proxy Win32/Glubteta.M. Windigo has also used multiple reverse proxy chains as part of their C2 infrastructure.[62] |
| S0117 | XTunnel |
XTunnel relays traffic between a C2 server and a victim.[63] |
| S1114 | ZIPLINE |
ZIPLINE can create a proxy server on compromised hosts.[64][65] |
| S0412 | ZxShell |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1037 | Filter Network Traffic |
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. |
| M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [67] |
| M1020 | SSL/TLS Inspection |
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Connection Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. |
| Network Traffic Content |
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). |
||
| Network Traffic Flow |
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |