Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.[1][2][3][4][5]
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| TA453 | |
| COBALT ILLUSION | |
| Charming Kitten | |
| ITG18 | |
| Phosphorus | |
| Newscaster |
Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).[15][1] |
| APT35 | |
| Mint Sandstorm |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows管理规范 |
Magic Hound has used a tool to run |
|
| Enterprise | T1595 | .002 | 主动扫描: Vulnerability Scanning |
Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j and ProxyShell vulnerabilities; CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in on-premises MS Exchange Servers; and CVE-2018-13379 in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPNs.[7][18] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | 从本地系统获取数据 |
Magic Hound has used a web shell to exfiltrate a ZIP file containing a dump of LSASS memory on a compromised machine.[17][19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1090 | 代理 |
Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service |
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.[19] |
| .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Magic Hound has used |
||
| .010 | 伪装: Masquerade Account Name |
Magic Hound has created local accounts named |
||
| Enterprise | T1598 | .003 | 信息钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
Magic Hound has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims.[3][2][6][5][20][18] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | 修改注册表 |
Magic Hound has modified Registry settings for security tools.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | 创建账户: Local Account |
Magic Hound has created local accounts named |
| Enterprise | T1190 | 利用公开应用程序漏洞 |
Magic Hound has exploited the Log4j utility (CVE-2021-44228), on-premises MS Exchange servers via "ProxyShell" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), and Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).[7][17][21][19][18][22] |
|
| Enterprise | T1573 | 加密通道 |
Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1572 | 协议隧道 |
Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[15][19][18] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
Magic Hound has used PowerShell for execution and privilege escalation.[15][1][17][19][18] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
Magic Hound has used the command-line interface for code execution.[15][17][19] |
||
| .005 | 命令与脚本解释器: Visual Basic |
Magic Hound malware has used VBS scripts for execution.[15] |
||
| Enterprise | T1482 | 域信任发现 |
Magic Hound has used a web shell to execute |
|
| Enterprise | T1584 | .001 | 基础设施妥协: Domains |
Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims.[2][5][3][20] |
| Enterprise | T1562 | 妨碍防御 |
Magic Hound has disabled LSA protection on compromised hosts using |
|
| .001 | Disable or Modify Tools |
Magic Hound has disabled antivirus services on targeted systems in order to upload malicious payloads.[17] |
||
| .002 | Disable Windows Event Logging |
Magic Hound has executed scripts to disable the event log service.[19] |
||
| .004 | Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic - |
||
| Enterprise | T1113 | 屏幕捕获 |
Magic Hound malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1071 | 应用层协议 |
Magic Hound malware has used IRC for C2.[15][19] |
|
| .001 | Web Protocols |
Magic Hound has used HTTP for C2.[15][17][19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1585 | .001 | 建立账户: Social Media Accounts |
Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--through messages and voice communications--to open malicious links.[2] |
| .002 | 建立账户: Email Accounts |
Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.[11][6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | 归档收集数据: Archive via Utility |
Magic Hound has used gzip to archive dumped LSASS process memory and RAR to stage and compress local folders.[1][17][19] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory |
Magic Hound has stolen domain credentials by dumping LSASS process memory using Task Manager, comsvcs.dll, and from a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller using Mimikatz.[1][17][19][18] |
| Enterprise | T1592 | .002 | 收集受害者主机信息: Software |
Magic Hound has captured the user-agent strings from visitors to their phishing sites.[20] |
| Enterprise | T1591 | .001 | 收集受害者组织信息: Determine Physical Locations |
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.[20] |
| Enterprise | T1590 | .005 | 收集受害者网络信息: IP Addresses |
Magic Hound has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites.[20] |
| Enterprise | T1589 | 收集受害者身份信息 |
Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.[5] |
|
| .001 | Credentials |
Magic Hound gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites. Magic Hound has also collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the US, Europe, and Israel.[11][18] |
||
| .002 | Email Addresses |
Magic Hound has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting.[5][20] |
||
| Enterprise | T1486 | 数据加密以实现影响 |
Magic Hound has used BitLocker and DiskCryptor to encrypt targeted workstations. [19][18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
Magic Hound malware can list a victim's logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices. Other malware can list a directory's contents.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1078 | .001 | 有效账户: Default Accounts |
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via |
| .002 | 有效账户: Domain Accounts |
Magic Hound has used domain administrator accounts after dumping LSASS process memory.[19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | 服务器软件组件: Web Shell |
Magic Hound has used multiple web shells to gain execution.[17][19] |
| Enterprise | T1570 | 横向工具传输 |
Magic Hound has copied tools within a compromised network using RDP.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1189 | 浏览器攻击 |
Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.[2] |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | .010 | 混淆文件或信息: Command Obfuscation |
Magic Hound has used base64-encoded commands.[15][18] |
| .013 | 混淆文件或信息: Encrypted/Encoded File |
Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded files and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.[15][18] |
||
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | 用户执行: Malicious Link |
Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious links embedded in emails.[2][3] |
| .002 | 用户执行: Malicious File |
Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious email attachments.[2] |
||
| Enterprise | T1114 | 电子邮件收集 |
Magic Hound has compromised email credentials in order to steal sensitive data.[3] |
|
| .001 | Local Email Collection |
Magic Hound has collected .PST archives.[1] |
||
| .002 | Remote Email Collection |
Magic Hound has exported emails from compromised Exchange servers including through use of the cmdlet |
||
| Enterprise | T1070 | .003 | 移除指标: Clear Command History |
Magic Hound has removed mailbox export requests from compromised Exchange servers.[17] |
| .004 | 移除指标: File Deletion |
Magic Hound has deleted and overwrote files to cover tracks.[15][1][19] |
||
| Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32 |
Magic Hound has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump from comsvcs.dll when dumping LSASS memory.[17] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
Magic Hound malware has used a PowerShell command to check the victim system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine. Other malware has obtained the OS version, UUID, and computer/host name to send to the C2 server.[15][17][19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1033 | 系统所有者/用户发现 |
Magic Hound malware has obtained the victim username and sent it to the C2 server.[15][17][19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1049 | 系统网络连接发现 |
Magic Hound has used quser.exe to identify existing RDP connections.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 |
Magic Hound malware gathers the victim's local IP address, MAC address, and external IP address.[15][17][19] |
|
| .001 | Internet Connection Discovery |
Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.[19] |
||
| .002 | Wi-Fi Discovery |
Magic Hound has collected names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks to which a device has previously connected.[7] |
||
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | 网络服务: Bidirectional Communication |
Magic Hound malware can use a SOAP Web service to communicate with its C2 server.[15] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | 网络服务发现 |
Magic Hound has used KPortScan 3.0 to perform SMB, RDP, and LDAP scanning.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | 获取基础设施: Domains |
Magic Hound has registered fraudulent domains such as "mail-newyorker.com" and "news12.com.recover-session-service.site" to target specific victims with phishing attacks.[3] |
| .006 | 获取基础设施: Web Services |
Magic Hound has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2.[7] |
||
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | 获取能力: Tool |
Magic Hound has obtained and used tools like Havij, sqlmap, Metasploit, Mimikatz, and Plink.[23][1][7][19][18] |
| Enterprise | T1087 | .003 | 账号发现: Email Account |
Magic Hound has used Powershell to discover email accounts.[17] |
| Enterprise | T1586 | .002 | 账号妥协: Email Accounts |
Magic Hound has compromised personal email accounts through the use of legitimate credentials and gathered additional victim information.[11] |
| Enterprise | T1098 | .002 | 账号操控: Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
Magic Hound granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on Middle East organizations.[1] |
| .007 | 账号操控: Additional Local or Domain Groups |
Magic Hound has added a user named DefaultAccount to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.[17] |
||
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
Magic Hound has downloaded additional code and files from servers onto victims.[15][17][19][18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | 输入捕获: Keylogging |
Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.[15] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
Magic Hound malware can list running processes.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.[17][19] |
| Enterprise | T1018 | 远程系统发现 |
Magic Hound has used Ping for discovery on targeted networks.[19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1567 | 通过网络服务渗出 |
Magic Hound has used the Telegram API |
|
| Enterprise | T1566 | .002 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download Pupy.[24][2][3][18] |
| .003 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing via Service |
Magic Hound used various social media channels (such as LinkedIn) as well as messaging services (such as WhatsApp) to spearphish victims.[25][12][2] |
||
| Enterprise | T1564 | .003 | 隐藏伪装: Hidden Window |
Magic Hound malware has a function to determine whether the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window.[15] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | 非标准端口 |
Magic Hound malware has communicated with its C2 server over TCP ports 4443 and 10151 using HTTP.[15][19] |
|
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task |
Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.[17][19] |