视频捕获

视频捕获指攻击者通过操控摄像头设备或相关应用程序非法获取视觉信息的行为,通常利用系统API或驱动漏洞实现视频流窃取。传统检测手段依赖于监控可疑进程的摄像头调用行为、异常视频文件生成模式或未授权设备激活事件,防御措施包括实施摄像头硬件指示灯强制开启策略、部署API调用行为分析系统等。

为规避摄像头使用提示灯、进程行为分析等传统检测机制,攻击者发展出多层次隐匿技术,通过硬件固件植入、合法进程寄生、加密传输通道构建等手法,将视频捕获行为深度嵌入系统正常运作流程,实现从物理层到应用层的全栈隐匿。

当前视频捕获匿迹技术的核心演进方向体现在两个维度:在行为维度,通过进程劫持和低频触发机制规避行为分析;在数据维度,采用实时加密和协议伪装突破内容检测。合法应用API劫持技术通过滥用系统信任关系,使恶意操作获得合法数字身份认证;加密实时传输重构数据流动范式,消除传统文件残留特征。这些技术的共性在于突破传统安全机制的监控维度,通过跨层协同隐匿实现"无进程、无文件、无流量"的终极隐匿效果。

视频捕获匿迹技术的发展迫使防御体系向硬件固件安全监测、多维度行为基线建模、加密流量元数据分析等方向演进,需构建涵盖物理层、系统层、网络层的全栈式视觉隐私保护框架,并研发基于边缘计算的实时信号特征检测技术应对硬件级隐匿威胁。

ID: T1125
Sub-techniques:  T1125.001, T1125.002
Tactic: 信息收集
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Praetorian
Version: 1.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 30 March 2023

匿迹效应

效应类型 是否存在
特征伪装
行为透明
数据遮蔽
时空释痕

特征伪装

攻击者通过模拟合法应用的API调用模式、伪装成标准流媒体协议等方式,使恶意视频流在进程行为、网络协议等层面呈现合法特征。例如劫持视频会议软件的摄像头调用接口时,其API调用栈、内存访问模式与正常视频通话完全一致,实现恶意行为的特征融合。

数据遮蔽

采用实时分块加密、自定义编码算法等技术对视频内容进行混淆,即使流量被截获也无法还原有效信息。加密视频流实时传输技术还将数据包嵌入HTTPS等加密通道,实现传输层与内容层的双重遮蔽。

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0331 Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video.[1][2]

S1087 AsyncRAT

AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems.[3]

S0234 Bandook

Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam.[4]

S0660 Clambling

Clambling can record screen content in AVI format.[5][6]

S0338 Cobian RAT

Cobian RAT has a feature to access the webcam on the victim’s machine.[7]

S0591 ConnectWise

ConnectWise can record video on remote hosts.[8]

S0115 Crimson

Crimson can capture webcam video on targeted systems.[9][10]

S0334 DarkComet

DarkComet can access the victim’s webcam to take pictures.[11][12]

S0021 Derusbi

Derusbi is capable of capturing video.[13]

G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear has exfiltrated images from compromised IP cameras.[14]

S0363 Empire

Empire can capture webcam data on Windows and macOS systems.[15]

S0152 EvilGrab

EvilGrab has the capability to capture video from a victim machine.[16]

G0046 FIN7

FIN7 created a custom video recording capability that could be used to monitor operations in the victim's environment.[17][18]

S0434 Imminent Monitor

Imminent Monitor has a remote webcam monitoring capability.[19][20]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole can remotely activate the victim’s webcam to capture content.[21][22]

S0283 jRAT

jRAT has the capability to capture video from a webcam.[23][24]

S0265 Kazuar

Kazuar captures images from the webcam.[25]

S0409 Machete

Machete takes photos from the computer’s web camera.[26][27][28]

S0336 NanoCore

NanoCore can access the victim's webcam and capture data.[29][30]

S0385 njRAT

njRAT can access the victim's webcam.[31][32]

S0644 ObliqueRAT

ObliqueRAT can capture images from webcams on compromised hosts.[33]

S1050 PcShare

PcShare can capture camera video as part of its collection process.[34]

S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT has used a Python tool named Bewmac to record the webcam on compromised hosts.[35]

S0192 Pupy

Pupy can access a connected webcam and capture pictures.[36]

S0262 QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT can perform webcam viewing.[37][38]

S0332 Remcos

Remcos can access a system’s webcam and take pictures.[39]

S0379 Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT has the ability to access the webcam.[40][41]

S0461 SDBbot

SDBbot has the ability to record video on a compromised host.[42][43]

G0091 Silence

Silence has been observed making videos of victims to observe bank employees day to day activities.[44][45]

S0098 T9000

T9000 uses the Skype API to record audio and video calls. It writes encrypted data to %APPDATA%\Intel\Skype.[46]

S0467 TajMahal

TajMahal has the ability to capture webcam video.[47]

S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can access the webcam on a victim's machine.[48][49]

S0412 ZxShell

ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.[50]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments that can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information.

DS0009 Process OS API Execution

Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.

References

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  1. Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
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  3. kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
  4. The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 01). NanoCore Is Not Your Average RAT. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
  5. Kasza, A., Halfpop, T. (2016, February 09). NanoCoreRAT Behind an Increase in Tax-Themed Phishing E-mails. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
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  19. GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019.
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