TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit |
TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.[6] [10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1595 | .001 | 主动扫描: Scanning IP Blocks |
TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.[6] |
| .002 | 主动扫描: Vulnerability Scanning |
TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.[6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1036 | 伪装 |
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.[10] |
|
| .005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location |
TeamTNT has replaced .dockerd and .dockerenv with their own scripts and cryptocurrency mining software.[10] |
||
| Enterprise | T1543 | .002 | 创建或修改系统进程: Systemd Service |
TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using |
| .003 | 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service |
TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.[7] |
||
| Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | 创建账户: Local Account |
TeamTNT has created local privileged users on victim machines.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | 反混淆/解码文件或信息 |
TeamTNT has used a script that decodes a Base64-encoded version of WeaveWorks Scope.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | |
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.[7] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners.[7] |
||
| .004 | 命令与脚本解释器: Unix Shell | |||
| .009 | 命令与脚本解释器: Cloud API |
TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.[11] |
||
| Enterprise | T1120 | 外围设备发现 |
TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1133 | 外部远程服务 |
TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.[3][10] TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools |
TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.[7][10] |
| .004 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall | |||
| Enterprise | T1613 | 容器与资源发现 |
TeamTNT has checked for running containers with |
|
| Enterprise | T1609 | 容器管理命令 |
TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1071 | 应用层协议 | ||
| .001 | Web Protocols |
TeamTNT has the |
||
| Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | 开发能力: Malware | |
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.[10] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
TeamTNT has used a script that checks |
|
| Enterprise | T1222 | .002 | 文件和目录权限修改: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification |
TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with |
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | 暂存能力: Upload Malware |
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1048 | 替代协议渗出 |
TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files |
TeamTNT has searched for unsecured AWS credentials and Docker API credentials.[4][6][10] |
| .004 | 未加密凭证: Private Keys | |||
| .005 | 未加密凭证: Cloud Instance Metadata API |
TeamTNT has queried the AWS instance metadata service for credentials.[6][10] |
||
| Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing |
TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.[6] |
| .013 | 混淆文件或信息: Encrypted/Encoded File |
TeamTNT has encrypted its binaries via AES and encoded files using Base64.[6][8] |
||
| Enterprise | T1204 | .003 | 用户执行: Malicious Image |
TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1070 | .002 | 移除指标: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | |
| .003 | 移除指标: Clear Command History | |||
| .004 | 移除指标: File Deletion |
TeamTNT has used a payload that removes itself after running. TeamTNT also has deleted locally staged files for collecting credentials or scan results for local IP addresses after exfiltrating them.[7][10] |
||
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, disk partition, logical volume, and hostname information.[7][10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1569 | 系统服务 |
TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1007 | 系统服务发现 |
TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security's aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security's bmc-agent service in order to disable them.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1049 | 系统网络连接发现 |
TeamTNT has run |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 | ||
| Enterprise | T1102 | 网络服务 |
TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.[8][10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1046 | 网络服务发现 |
TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.[4][5][10] TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.[1] |
|
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | 获取基础设施: Domains | |
| Enterprise | T1098 | .004 | 账号操控: SSH Authorized Keys | |
| Enterprise | T1496 | .001 | 资源劫持: Compute Hijacking |
TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency.[2][4] TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.[10] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | 软件发现: Security Software Discovery |
TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.[7][10] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
TeamTNT has the |
|
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
TeamTNT has searched for rival malware and removes it if found.[6] TeamTNT has also searched for running processes containing the strings aliyun or liyun to identify machines running Alibaba Cloud Security tools.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1021 | .004 | 远程服务: SSH |
TeamTNT has used SSH to connect back to victim machines.[3] TeamTNT has also used SSH to transfer tools and payloads onto victim hosts and execute them.[10] |
| Enterprise | T1219 | 远程访问软件 |
TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.[5][10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1611 | 逃逸至主机 |
TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.[3][8] |
|
| Enterprise | T1610 | 部署容器 |
TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.[3][6] TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.[10] |
|