数据销毁是指攻击者通过覆盖、删除或其他破坏性手段使目标系统数据不可恢复,旨在破坏业务可用性或掩盖攻击痕迹。传统数据销毁技术通常表现为大规模文件修改、异常磁盘写入或突发性存储资源删除,可通过监控文件系统变更事件、存储I/O模式异常及云平台删除API调用频率进行检测。防御措施包括部署文件完整性监控、实施最小权限访问控制以及建立云操作审计机制。
为规避传统检测手段,攻击者将数据销毁行为重构为具有时序分散性、操作合法化及环境融合性的隐蔽攻击链。通过分阶段任务执行、可信工具滥用和云原生API劫持等手法,将恶意删除操作解构为看似合规的数据管理活动,在维持破坏效果的同时降低行为异常性。
当前数据销毁匿迹技术的核心在于构建多维度伪装体系:加密覆盖销毁通过密码学过程将恶意擦除转化为合法加密操作;合法工具滥用擦除利用系统信任机制规避进程行为分析;时间延迟删除依托长周期任务调度稀释攻击特征;云服务API伪装擦除则深度融入云平台运维生态。四类技术的共性在于突破传统"删除即异常"的检测假设,通过操作场景模拟、系统信任链劫持和攻击节奏控制,使数据销毁行为在权限、时序、协议等多个层面符合正常业务特征,从而绕过基于规则匹配或阈值告警的防护体系。
匿迹技术的发展导致传统依赖文件修改监控和批量删除检测的防御手段逐渐失效,防御方需构建行为意图识别模型,结合数据流谱系分析、云操作上下文感知等技术,实现对伪装删除行为的深度检测,并通过零信任架构实施关键数据的多副本防篡改保护。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ❌ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ✅ |
攻击者通过模拟合法数据管理操作实现恶意删除行为的特征隐匿。例如调用系统内置工具执行覆盖操作,或使用云平台标准API实施资源删除,使数据销毁行为在进程签名、API调用链等维度与正常运维活动高度相似,规避基于操作特征匹配的检测规则。
采用加密覆写技术时,攻击过程产生的磁盘写入数据为加密随机流,使得数据恢复工具无法识别原始内容。同时加密操作本身属于常见安全实践,其产生的存储层变化难以与正常加密行为区分,实现了数据销毁痕迹的深度隐藏。
通过分阶段删除和时间延迟策略,将集中式数据销毁任务拆解为长周期、低强度的离散操作。单次删除行为在时间和空间维度均低于检测阈值,同时利用云环境的多区域特性分散操作源头,使得整体攻击特征被稀释在正常业务操作的时间序列和地理分布中。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0034 | 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions.[1] |
| S1125 | AcidRain |
AcidRain performs an in-depth wipe of the target filesystem and various attached storage devices through either a data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase it.[2] |
| S1133 | Apostle |
Apostle initially masqueraded as ransomware but actual functionality is a data destruction tool, supported by an internal name linked to an early version, |
| G0082 | APT38 |
APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.[4] |
| S0089 | BlackEnergy |
BlackEnergy 2 contains a "Destroy" plug-in that destroys data stored on victim hard drives by overwriting file contents.[5][6] |
| S0693 | CaddyWiper |
CaddyWiper can work alphabetically through drives on a compromised system to take ownership of and overwrite all files.[7][8] |
| S1134 | DEADWOOD |
DEADWOOD overwrites files on victim systems with random data to effectively destroy them.[3] |
| S0659 | Diavol |
Diavol can delete specified files from a targeted system.[9] |
| S0697 | HermeticWiper |
HermeticWiper can recursively wipe folders and files in |
| S0604 | Industroyer |
Industroyer’s data wiper module clears registry keys and overwrites both ICS configuration and Windows files.[11] |
| S0265 | Kazuar |
Kazuar can overwrite files with random data before deleting them.[12] |
| S0607 | KillDisk |
KillDisk deletes system files to make the OS unbootable. KillDisk also targets and deletes files with 35 different file extensions.[13] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources both on-premises and in the cloud.[14][15] |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.[16] |
| S0688 | Meteor |
Meteor can fill a victim's files and directories with zero-bytes in replacement of real content before deleting them.[17] |
| S1135 | MultiLayer Wiper |
MultiLayer Wiper deletes files on network drives, but corrupts and overwrites with random data files stored locally.[18] |
| S0365 | Olympic Destroyer |
Olympic Destroyer overwrites files locally and on remote shares.[19][20] |
| S0139 | PowerDuke |
PowerDuke has a command to write random data across a file and delete it.[21] |
| S0238 | Proxysvc |
Proxysvc can overwrite files indicated by the attacker before deleting them.[22] |
| S0364 | RawDisk |
RawDisk was used in Shamoon to write to protected system locations such as the MBR and disk partitions in an effort to destroy data.[23][24] |
| S0496 | REvil |
REvil has the capability to destroy files and folders.[25][26][27][27][28][29][30] |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used CaddyWiper, SDelete, and the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on victim systems. [31][32][1] Additionally, Sandworm Team has used the JUNKMAIL tool to overwrite files with null bytes.[33] |
| S0195 | SDelete |
SDelete deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable.[34] |
| S0140 | Shamoon |
Shamoon attempts to overwrite operating system files and disk structures with image files.[35][36][23] In a later variant, randomly generated data was used for data overwrites.[24][37] |
| S0380 | StoneDrill |
StoneDrill has a disk wiper module that targets files other than those in the Windows directory.[38] |
| S0689 | WhisperGate |
WhisperGate can corrupt files by overwriting the first 1 MB with |
| S0341 | Xbash |
Xbash has destroyed Linux-based databases as part of its ransomware capabilities.[45] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1053 | Data Backup |
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[46] Ensure backups are stored off system and protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) delete for cloud storage resources, such as AWS S3 buckets, to prevent unauthorized deletion of critical data and infrastructure. MFA delete requires additional authentication steps, making it significantly more difficult for adversaries to destroy data without proper credentials. This additional security layer helps protect against the impact of data destruction in cloud environments by ensuring that only authenticated actions can irreversibly delete storage or machine images. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
In cloud environments, limit permissions to modify cloud bucket lifecycle policies (e.g., |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0010 | Cloud Storage | Cloud Storage Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a cloud storage infrastructure, such as the |
| Cloud Storage Modification |
Monitor for unexpected use of lifecycle policies. Where lifecycle policies are already in use, monitor for changes to cloud storage configurations and policies, such as buckets configured in the policy or unusually short retention periods. In AWS environments, monitor for |
||
| DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments for binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete. |
| DS0022 | File | File Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion to a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23) |
| File Modification |
Monitor for changes made to a large quantity of files for unexpected modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32. |
||
| DS0007 | Image | Image Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images |
| DS0030 | Instance | Instance Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a virtual machine or database instance (ex: |
| DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
Monitor for newly executed processes of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete. |
| DS0020 | Snapshot | Snapshot Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a snapshot (ex: AWS |
| DS0034 | Volume | Volume Deletion |
Monitor for unexpected deletion of a cloud volume (ex: AWS |