Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1][2] The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as Andariel, APT37, APT38, and Kimsuky.
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Labyrinth Chollima | |
| HIDDEN COBRA |
The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.[1][5] |
| Guardians of Peace | |
| ZINC | |
| NICKEL ACADEMY | |
| Diamond Sleet |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows管理规范 |
Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.[3][13][14][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.[9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1220 | XSL脚本处理 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a remote XSL script to download a Base64-encoded DLL custom downloader.[9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1557 | .001 | 中间人攻击: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command |
| Enterprise | T1005 | 从本地系统获取数据 |
Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.[3][16][13][14] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used malicious Trojans and DLL files to exfiltrate data from an infected host.[10][11] |
|
| Enterprise | T1090 | .001 | 代理: Internal Proxy |
Lazarus Group has used a compromised router to serve as a proxy between a victim network's corporate and restricted segments.[14] |
| .002 | 代理: External Proxy |
Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.[17][18] |
||
| Enterprise | T1036 | .003 | 伪装: Rename System Utilities |
Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as |
| .004 | 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service |
Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named |
||
| .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files.[20][15] |
||
| .008 | 伪装: Masquerade File Type |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.[11][9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1656 | 伪装 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group impersonated HR hiring personnel through LinkedIn messages and conducted interviews with victims in order to deceive them into downloading malware.[10][9][21] |
|
| Enterprise | T1534 | 内部鱼叉式钓鱼 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted internal spearphishing from within a compromised organization.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service |
Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.[3][22] |
| Enterprise | T1573 | .001 | 加密通道: Symmetric Cryptography |
Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[3][22][23][24] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.[11] |
| Enterprise | T1574 | .002 | 劫持执行流: DLL Side-Loading |
Lazarus Group has replaced |
| .013 | 劫持执行流: KernelCallbackTable |
Lazarus Group has abused the |
||
| Enterprise | T1620 | 反射性代码加载 |
Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.[25][15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1140 | 反混淆/解码文件或信息 |
Lazarus Group has used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs and shellcode into memory at runtime.[25][15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[3][13][23][25] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.[11] |
| .009 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Shortcut Modification |
Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.[23] |
||
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.[26] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims.[9] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.[3][22][23][27][15] A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.[24] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group launched malicious DLL files, created new folders, and renamed folders with the use of the Windows command shell.[9][11] |
||
| .005 | 命令与脚本解释器: Visual Basic |
Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.[25][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed a VBA written malicious macro after victims download malicious DOTM files; Lazarus Group also used Visual Basic macro code to extract a double Base64 encoded DLL implant.[10][11] |
||
| Enterprise | T1008 | 回退信道 |
Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.[3][13] |
|
| Enterprise | T1584 | .001 | 基础设施妥协: Domains |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.[11][12] |
| .004 | 基础设施妥协: Server |
Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.[14] For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised servers to host their malicious tools.[10][9][11] |
||
| Enterprise | T1104 | 多阶段信道 |
Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.[25] |
|
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools |
Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.[3][16][28][27]. |
| .004 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. [3][16][28] |
||
| Enterprise | T1203 | 客户端执行漏洞利用 |
Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.[29] |
|
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | 应用层协议: Web Protocols |
Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.[23][30][18][25][15][19] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers.[11] |
| Enterprise | T1010 | 应用窗口发现 |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.[3][16][28] |
|
| Enterprise | T1585 | .001 | 建立账户: Social Media Accounts |
Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.[26] For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.[10][9] |
| .002 | 建立账户: Email Accounts |
Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.[14] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.[9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1587 | .001 | 开发能力: Malware |
Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.[31][26] For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.[10][9][11][12] |
| .002 | 开发能力: Code Signing Certificates |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility.[9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1560 | 归档收集数据 |
Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. [16][13][23] |
|
| .001 | Archive via Utility |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group archived victim's data into a RAR file.[9] |
||
| .002 | Archive via Library |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[13][23] |
||
| .003 | Archive via Custom Method |
A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.[3][16][13][23] |
||
| Enterprise | T1593 | .001 | 搜索开放网站/域: Social Media |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization.[9] |
| Enterprise | T1591 | 收集受害者组织信息 |
Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.[14] For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.[10] |
|
| .004 | Identify Roles |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.[10][9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1589 | .002 | 收集受害者身份信息: Email Addresses |
Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.[14] |
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[3][16] |
| Enterprise | T1001 | .003 | 数据混淆: Protocol or Service Impersonation |
Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.[3][22][23][32] |
| Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | 数据编码: Standard Encoding |
A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.[23] |
| Enterprise | T1485 | 数据销毁 |
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.[3] |
|
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.[3][24][25][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted word searches within documents on a compromised host in search of security and financial matters.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | 暂存能力: Upload Malware |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.[10][9][11][12] |
| .002 | 暂存能力: Upload Tool |
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used multiple servers to host malicious tools.[9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1110 | .003 | 暴力破解: Password Spraying |
Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.[3][13] |
| Enterprise | T1048 | .003 | 替代协议渗出: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.[3][13] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | 有效账户 |
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1489 | 服务停止 |
Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.[22] |
|
| Enterprise | T1505 | .004 | 服务器软件组件: IIS Components |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted Windows servers running Internet Information Systems (IIS) to install C2 components.[11] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | 本机API |
Lazarus Group has used the Windows API During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Windows API |
|
| Enterprise | T1012 | 查询注册表 |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key: |
|
| Enterprise | T1221 | 模板注入 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used DOCX files to retrieve a malicious document template/DOTM file.[10][11] |
|
| Enterprise | T1189 | 浏览器攻击 |
Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.[33][26] |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | .002 | 混淆文件或信息: Software Packing |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection.[10][11][12] |
| .007 | 混淆文件或信息: Dynamic API Resolution |
Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.[25] |
||
| .013 | 混淆文件或信息: Encrypted/Encoded File |
Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.[3][16][13][23][18][25][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group encrypted malware such as DRATzarus with XOR and DLL files with base64.[10][9][11][12] |
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| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | 用户执行: Malicious Link |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.[10][9] |
| .002 | 用户执行: Malicious File |
Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.[29][14][25][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured victims into executing malicious documents that contained "dream job" descriptions from defense, aerospace, and other sectors.[10][11] |
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| Enterprise | T1561 | .001 | 磁盘擦除: Disk Content Wipe |
Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.[22] |
| .002 | 磁盘擦除: Disk Structure Wipe |
Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.[27][3] |
||
| Enterprise | T1070 | 移除指标 |
Lazarus Group has restored malicious KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.[25] |
|
| .003 | Clear Command History |
Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.[14] |
||
| .004 | File Deletion |
Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.[3][24] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer.[9] |
||
| .006 | Timestomp |
Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.[3][22][16][24] |
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| Enterprise | T1491 | .001 | 篡改: Internal Defacement |
Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.[22] |
| Enterprise | T1218 | 系统二进制代理执行 |
Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client ( |
|
| .005 | Mshta |
Lazarus Group has used |
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| .010 | Regsvr32 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used |
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| .011 | Rundll32 |
Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[19] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed malware with |
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| Enterprise | T1614 | .001 | 系统位置发现: System Language Discovery |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.[10] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.[3][22][16][23][24][25] |
|
| Enterprise | T1529 | 系统关机/重启 |
Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.[27] |
|
| Enterprise | T1033 | 系统所有者/用户发现 |
Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.[3][22][16][13][23][30][25] |
|
| Enterprise | T1124 | 系统时间发现 |
A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.[24] |
|
| Enterprise | T1049 | 系统网络连接发现 |
Lazarus Group has used |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 |
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.[3][16] |
|
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | 网络服务: Bidirectional Communication |
Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.[25] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | 网络服务发现 |
Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | 获取基础设施: Domains |
Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.[31][26] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort.[9] |
| .004 | 获取基础设施: Server |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.[9] |
||
| .006 | 获取基础设施: Web Services |
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.[31] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.[10] |
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| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | 获取能力: Tool |
Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.[14] For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group obtained tools such as Wake-On-Lan, Responder, ChromePass, and dbxcli.[10][9] |
| .003 | 获取能力: Code Signing Certificates |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.[9] |
||
| .004 | 获取能力: Digital Certificates |
Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.[31] |
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| Enterprise | T1497 | .001 | 虚拟化/沙盒规避: System Checks |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.[10] |
| .003 | 虚拟化/沙盒规避: Time Based Evasion |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that collected |
||
| Enterprise | T1134 | .002 | 访问令牌操控: Create Process with Token |
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call |
| Enterprise | T1622 | 调试器规避 |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the |
|
| Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | 账号发现: Domain Account |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group queried compromised victim's active directory servers to obtain the list of employees including administrator accounts.[9] |
| Enterprise | T1098 | 账号操控 |
Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.[3][22] |
|
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.[3][22][16][30][18][14][26][25][15][19] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group downloaded multistage malware and tools onto a compromised host.[10][9][11] |
|
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | 输入捕获: Keylogging |
Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[3][28] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times.[3][16][23][24][18][25] |
|
| Enterprise | T1055 | .001 | 进程注入: Dynamic-link Library Injection |
A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.[23][25] |
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.[3][13] |
| .002 | 远程服务: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the |
||
| .004 | 远程服务: SSH |
Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.[14] |
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| Enterprise | T1041 | 通过C2信道渗出 |
Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.[3][16][23] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.[10] |
|
| Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | 通过网络服务渗出: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a custom build of open-source command-line dbxcli to exfiltrate stolen data to Dropbox.[9][10] |
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Attachment |
Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.[29][14][25][15] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent emails with malicious attachments to gain unauthorized access to targets' computers.[10][11] |
| .002 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.[14] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.[10][9] |
||
| .003 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing via Service |
Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.[26] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent victims spearphishing messages via LinkedIn concerning fictitious jobs.[10][9] |
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| Enterprise | T1202 | 间接命令执行 |
Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used |
|
| Enterprise | T1564 | .001 | 隐藏伪装: Hidden Files and Directories |
Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.[23][30][18][25] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | 非标准端口 |
Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.[3][13] |
|
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task |
Lazarus Group has used During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.[9] |
| Enterprise | T1542 | .003 | 预操作系统引导: Bootkit |
Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.[3][22] |
| Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | 颠覆信任控制: Code Signing |
Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.[25] During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their own malware to evade detection.[9] |
| ICS | T0865 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Lazarus Group has been observed targeting organizations using spearphishing documents with embedded malicious payloads. [34] Highly targeted spear phishing campaigns have been conducted against a U.S. electric grid company. [35] |
|