Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Black Banshee | |
| Velvet Chollima | |
| Emerald Sleet | |
| THALLIUM | |
| APT43 | |
| TA427 |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1557 | 中间人攻击 |
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.[4] |
|
| Enterprise | T1546 | .001 | 事件触发执行: Change Default File Association |
Kimsuky has a HWP document stealer module which changes the default program association in the registry to open HWP documents.[13] |
| Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | 从密码存储中获取凭证: Credentials from Web Browsers |
Kimsuky has used browser extensions including Google Chrome to steal passwords and cookies from browsers. Kimsuky has also used Nirsoft's WebBrowserPassView tool to dump the passwords obtained from victims.[10][4][7][14] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | 从本地系统获取数据 |
Kimsuky has collected Office, PDF, and HWP documents from its victims.[13][14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | 伪装: Masquerade Task or Service |
Kimsuky has disguised services to appear as benign software or related to operating system functions.[4] |
| .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as |
||
| Enterprise | T1550 | .002 | 使用备用认证材料: Pass the Hash |
Kimsuky has used pass the hash for authentication to remote access software used in C2.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1598 | 信息钓鱼 |
Kimsuky has used tailored spearphishing emails to gather victim information including contat lists to identify additional targets.[5] |
|
| .003 | Spearphishing Link |
Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information including web beacons for target profiling.[16][3][17][6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1112 | 修改注册表 |
Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.[4][18][14][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1534 | 内部鱼叉式钓鱼 |
Kimsuky has sent internal spearphishing emails for lateral movement after stealing victim information.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | 创建或修改系统进程: Windows Service | |
| Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | 创建账户: Local Account | |
| Enterprise | T1190 | 利用公开应用程序漏洞 |
Kimsuky has exploited various vulnerabilities for initial access, including Microsoft Exchange vulnerability CVE-2020-0688.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1620 | 反射性代码加载 |
Kimsuky has used the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script to reflectively load a Mimikatz credential stealing DLL into memory.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1140 | 反混淆/解码文件或信息 | ||
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the |
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts including Invoke-Mimikatz.[1][4][14][17][5] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
Kimsuky has executed Windows commands by using |
||
| .005 | 命令与脚本解释器: Visual Basic |
Kimsuky has used Visual Basic to download malicious payloads.[11][16][18][14] Kimsuky has also used malicious VBA macros within maldocs disguised as forms that trigger when a victim types any content into the lure.[14] |
||
| .006 | 命令与脚本解释器: Python |
Kimsuky has used a macOS Python implant to gather data as well as MailFetcher.py code to automatically collect email data.[4][17] |
||
| .007 | 命令与脚本解释器: JavaScript |
Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools.[16][4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1584 | .001 | 基础设施妥协: Domains |
Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.[17][5] |
| Enterprise | T1133 | 外部远程服务 | ||
| Enterprise | T1111 | 多因素身份验证拦截 |
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools |
Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.[13][14] |
| .004 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.[13] |
||
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | 应用层协议: Web Protocols | |
| .002 | 应用层协议: File Transfer Protocols |
Kimsuky has used FTP to download additional malware to the target machine.[16] |
||
| .003 | 应用层协议: Mail Protocols |
Kimsuky has used e-mail to send exfiltrated data to C2 servers.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1585 | .001 | 建立账户: Social Media Accounts |
Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.[17] |
| .002 | 建立账户: Email Accounts |
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.[17][5][6] |
||
| Enterprise | T1587 | 开发能力 |
Kimsuky created and used a mailing toolkit to use in spearphishing attacks.[16] |
|
| .001 | Malware |
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.[17][14][5] |
||
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | 归档收集数据: Archive via Utility |
Kimsuky has used QuickZip to archive stolen files before exfiltration.[14] |
| .003 | 归档收集数据: Archive via Custom Method | |||
| Enterprise | T1594 | 搜索受害者拥有的网站 |
Kimsuky has searched for information on the target company's website.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1593 | .001 | 搜索开放网站/域: Social Media |
Kimsuky has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails.[3] |
| .002 | 搜索开放网站/域: Search Engines |
Kimsuky has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google to target victims.[17] |
||
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory |
Kimsuky has gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[4][7][17] |
| Enterprise | T1591 | 收集受害者组织信息 |
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.[17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1589 | .002 | 收集受害者身份信息: Email Addresses |
Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses including personal accounts that were subsequently used for spearphishing and other forms of social engineering.[3][6] |
| .003 | 收集受害者身份信息: Employee Names | |||
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under |
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system.[13][14][17] |
|
| Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | 暂存能力: Upload Malware |
Kimsuky has used compromised and acquired infrastructure to host and deliver malware including Blogspot to host beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants.[14][5] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | .003 | 有效账户: Local Accounts |
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | 服务器软件组件: Web Shell |
Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding "Dinosaur" references within the code.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files |
Kimsuky has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from saved mail.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | 查询注册表 |
Kimsuky has obtained specific Registry keys and values on a compromised host.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1176 | 浏览器扩展 |
Kimsuky has used Google Chrome browser extensions to infect victims and to steal passwords and cookies.[10][7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1027 | 混淆文件或信息 |
Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding.[11][16] Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format.[14] |
|
| .002 | Software Packing | |||
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | 用户执行: Malicious Link |
Kimsuky has lured victims into clicking malicious links.[17] |
| .002 | 用户执行: Malicious File |
Kimsuky has used attempted to lure victims into opening malicious e-mail attachments.[11][16][4][2][3][14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1114 | .002 | 电子邮件收集: Remote Email Collection |
Kimsuky has used tools such as the MailFetch mail crawler to collect victim emails (excluding spam) from online services via IMAP.[17] |
| .003 | 电子邮件收集: Email Forwarding Rule |
Kimsuky has set auto-forward rules on victim's e-mail accounts.[4] |
||
| Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | 移除指标: File Deletion |
Kimsuky has deleted the exfiltrated data on disk after transmission. Kimsuky has also used an instrumentor script to terminate browser processes running on an infected system and then delete the cookie files on disk.[13][14][17] |
| .006 | 移除指标: Timestomp |
Kimsuky has manipulated timestamps for creation or compilation dates to defeat anti-forensics.[2] |
||
| Enterprise | T1218 | .005 | 系统二进制代理执行: Mshta |
Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[1][4][18][17] |
| .010 | 系统二进制代理执行: Regsvr32 | |||
| .011 | 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32 |
Kimsuky has used |
||
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
Kimsuky has enumerated drives, OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the "systeminfo" command.[13][14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1007 | 系统服务发现 |
Kimsuky has used an instrumentor script to gather the names of all services running on a victim's system.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 |
Kimsuky has used |
|
| Enterprise | T1040 | 网络嗅探 |
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.[4][7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | 网络服务: Bidirectional Communication | |
| Enterprise | T1583 | 获取基础设施 |
Kimsuky has used funds from stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to acquire operational infrastructure.[5] |
|
| .001 | Domains |
Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties including search engines, web platforms, and cryptocurrency exchanges.[11][19][4][2][3][17][5] |
||
| .004 | Server |
Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.[17] |
||
| .006 | Web Services |
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | 获取能力: Tool |
Kimsuky has obtained and used tools such as Nirsoft WebBrowserPassVIew, Mimikatz, and PsExec.[7][14][5] |
| .005 | 获取能力: Exploits | |||
| Enterprise | T1657 | 财务窃取 |
Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1586 | .002 | 账号妥协: Email Accounts |
Kimsuky has compromised email accounts to send spearphishing e-mails.[16][3] |
| Enterprise | T1098 | .007 | 账号操控: Additional Local or Domain Groups |
Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with |
| Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | 软件发现: Security Software Discovery |
Kimsuky has checked for the presence of antivirus software with |
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
Kimsuky has downloaded additional scripts, tools, and malware onto victim systems.[18][14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | 输入捕获: Keylogging |
Kimsuky has used a PowerShell-based keylogger as well as a tool called MECHANICAL to log keystrokes.[1][13][4][7][14][17] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
Kimsuky can gather a list of all processes running on a victim's machine.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1055 | 进程注入 |
Kimsuky has used Win7Elevate to inject malicious code into explorer.exe.[13] |
|
| .012 | Process Hollowing |
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | 远程服务: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1219 | 远程访问软件 |
Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.[13][18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1041 | 通过C2信道渗出 | ||
| Enterprise | T1567 | .002 | 通过网络服务渗出: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.[14] |
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Attachment |
Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.[10][13][11][16][2][3][14][17] |
| .002 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
Kimsuky has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a document that contained malicious macros or took the victim to an actor-controlled domain.[1][7][17] |
||
| Enterprise | T1564 | .002 | 隐藏伪装: Hidden Users |
Kimsuky has run |
| .003 | 隐藏伪装: Hidden Window |
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task |
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[17] |
| Enterprise | T1553 | .002 | 颠覆信任控制: Code Signing | |