MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Earth Vetala | |
| MERCURY | |
| Static Kitten | |
| Seedworm | |
| TEMP.Zagros | |
| Mango Sandstorm | |
| TA450 |
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows管理规范 |
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.[14][4][15][7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1555 | 从密码存储中获取凭证 |
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.[2][3][9] |
|
| .003 | Credentials from Web Browsers |
MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.[3][9] |
||
| Enterprise | T1090 | .002 | 代理: External Proxy |
MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.[3] MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2).[6][9] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | 伪装: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender.[11][15][10] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | 利用公开应用程序漏洞 |
MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688).[7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1137 | .001 | 办公应用启动: Office Template Macros |
MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm, for persistence.[6] |
| Enterprise | T1573 | .001 | 加密通道: Symmetric Cryptography |
MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.[8] |
| Enterprise | T1574 | .002 | 劫持执行流: DLL Side-Loading |
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.[7] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | 反混淆/解码文件或信息 |
MuddyWater has decoded base64-encoded PowerShell, JavaScript, and VBScript.[11][16][4][8] |
|
| Enterprise | T1547 | .001 | 启动或登录自动启动执行: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key |
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | 命令与脚本解释器: PowerShell |
MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.[11][16][14][3][4][15][6][9][7][8] |
| .003 | 命令与脚本解释器: Windows Command Shell |
MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.[3] |
||
| .005 | 命令与脚本解释器: Visual Basic |
MuddyWater has used VBScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload, as well as macros.[11][16][14][3][4][5][6][9][8] |
||
| .006 | 命令与脚本解释器: Python |
MuddyWater has developed tools in Python including Out1.[9] |
||
| .007 | 命令与脚本解释器: JavaScript |
MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload.[4][11][7] |
||
| Enterprise | T1104 | 多阶段信道 |
MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send data back.[15] |
|
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | 妨碍防御: Disable or Modify Tools |
MuddyWater can disable the system's local proxy settings.[9] |
| Enterprise | T1203 | 客户端执行漏洞利用 |
MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.[5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1113 | 屏幕捕获 |
MuddyWater has used malware that can capture screenshots of the victim’s machine.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | 应用层协议: Web Protocols |
MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.[5][9] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | 归档收集数据: Archive via Utility |
MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | 操作系统凭证转储: LSASS Memory |
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.[2][3][9] |
| .004 | 操作系统凭证转储: LSA Secrets |
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.[2][3] |
||
| .005 | 操作系统凭证转储: Cached Domain Credentials |
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.[2][3] |
||
| Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | 数据分段: Local Data Staging |
MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's |
| Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | 数据编码: Standard Encoding |
MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2 communications including Base64 encoding.[5][9] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | 文件和目录发现 |
MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords "Kasper," "Panda," or "ESET."[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | 未加密凭证: Credentials In Files |
MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | .003 | 混淆文件或信息: Steganography |
MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg.[4] |
| .004 | 混淆文件或信息: Compile After Delivery |
MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C# code.[4] |
||
| .010 | 混淆文件或信息: Command Obfuscation |
MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.[2][17] The group has also used other obfuscation methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell commands.[2][11][14][15][5][9][8] |
||
| Enterprise | T1548 | .002 | 滥用权限提升控制机制: Bypass User Account Control |
MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass UAC.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1204 | .001 | 用户执行: Malicious Link |
MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.[10][9][13] |
| .002 | 用户执行: Malicious File |
MuddyWater has attempted to get users to open malicious PDF attachment and to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.[2][11][14][15][5][6][10][9][7][8][13] |
||
| Enterprise | T1218 | .003 | 系统二进制代理执行: CMSTP |
MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious INF to execute its POWERSTATS payload.[11] |
| .005 | 系统二进制代理执行: Mshta |
MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution.[11][14] |
||
| .011 | 系统二进制代理执行: Rundll32 |
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1082 | 系统信息发现 |
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s OS version and machine name.[14][15][6][9][8] |
|
| Enterprise | T1033 | 系统所有者/用户发现 |
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s username.[14][9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1049 | 系统网络连接发现 |
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.[9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1016 | 系统网络配置发现 |
MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim’s IP address and domain name.[14] |
|
| Enterprise | T1102 | .002 | 网络服务: Bidirectional Communication |
MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.[10] |
| Enterprise | T1583 | .006 | 获取基础设施: Web Services |
MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Sync, and TeraBox to distribute tools.[10][9][13] |
| Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | 获取能力: Tool |
MuddyWater has used legitimate tools ConnectWise, RemoteUtilities, and SimpleHelp to gain access to the target environment.[10][18] |
| Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | 账号发现: Domain Account |
MuddyWater has used |
| Enterprise | T1518 | 软件发现 |
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.[9] |
|
| .001 | Security Software Discovery |
MuddyWater has used malware to check running processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1105 | 输入工具传输 |
MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victim’s machine.[14][4][6][9] |
|
| Enterprise | T1057 | 进程发现 |
MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on the system.[14][5] |
|
| Enterprise | T1559 | .001 | 进程间通信: Component Object Model |
MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.[14][5][7] |
| .002 | 进程间通信: Dynamic Data Exchange |
MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via DDE.[14] |
||
| Enterprise | T1210 | 远程服务漏洞利用 |
MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).[7] |
|
| Enterprise | T1219 | 远程访问软件 |
MuddyWater has used legitimate applications ScreenConnect, AteraAgent and SimpleHelp to manage systems remotely and move laterally.[9][10][13][18] |
|
| Enterprise | T1041 | 通过C2信道渗出 |
MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.[6] |
|
| Enterprise | T1566 | .001 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Attachment |
MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.[2][11][14][5][10][9] [7][13] |
| .002 | 钓鱼: Spearphishing Link |
MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.[10][9][13] |
||
| Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | 预定任务/作业: Scheduled Task |
MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[6] |