修改身份验证过程是攻击者通过篡改系统认证组件或流程，实现非法访问权限获取或凭证窃取的技术。该技术通常针对操作系统的核心安全组件（如Windows LSASS、Linux PAM框架）进行代码注入或配置篡改，以绕过双因素认证、窃取明文密码或生成伪造令牌。防御措施包括监控认证相关进程的内存操作、审计系统插件完整性，以及检测异常身份验证日志模式。
为规避传统基于行为规则和静态特征检测的防御体系，攻击者发展出深度嵌入系统认证工作流的匿迹技术。通过将恶意代码与合法认证组件进行运行时融合，并利用系统自身的信任机制掩盖攻击痕迹，使得非法认证行为在协议合规性和流程完整性层面均呈现合法特征，显著提升检测难度。
当前修改身份验证过程的匿迹技术呈现出"深度系统融合"与"动态行为隐匿"两大特征。攻击者通过Hook注入实现认证逻辑的实时篡改，避免持久化痕迹遗留；利用内存操作技术绕过磁盘扫描检测；借助合法插件架构实现恶意代码的协议级伪装。各子技术的共性在于突破传统漏洞利用模式，转而通过系统信任链渗透构建"合法作恶"机制：认证函数Hook注入利用系统调试接口的天然权限实施无文件攻击；动态密码过滤器劫持通过LSA组件加载机制实现隐蔽驻留；内存凭证捕获绕过直接操纵内核数据结构消除日志证据；跨平台插件伪装则利用多环境信任传递扩大攻击面。这些技术通过复用系统安全机制的设计缺陷，在维持认证流程表面合规性的同时完成权限提升。
匿迹技术的演进导致传统基于日志审计和文件监控的防御手段面临失效风险，防御方需加强运行时内存保护、实施认证组件行为基线分析，并建立跨平台的信任链验证机制。同时，需结合硬件级可信执行环境（TEE）对关键认证流程进行隔离防护，通过零信任架构降低单点沦陷的影响范围。
| 效应类型 | 是否存在 |
|---|---|
| 特征伪装 | ✅ |
| 行为透明 | ✅ |
| 数据遮蔽 | ✅ |
| 时空释痕 | ❌ |
攻击者通过仿冒合法认证插件、劫持系统信任链，使恶意代码具备数字签名验证通过、文件路径合法等表面特征。例如将后门DLL注册为官方LSA通知包组件，或部署具有有效签名的恶意PAM模块，使得防御方难以通过静态特征识别异常组件。
技术实施过程中频繁利用零日漏洞（如未公开的LSASS内存操作漏洞）进行权限提升，并针对新型认证协议（如FIDO2）设计绕过逻辑，使得传统基于已知攻击模式的检测机制无法有效识别。
在凭证窃取阶段采用内存加密传输、HTTPS外联通道等方式隐藏敏感数据，部分高级变种利用TLS 1.3的加密特性混淆外传流量，使得网络层数据包分析难以发现异常通信。
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0377 | Ebury |
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized |
| G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has replaced legitimate KeePass binaries with trojanized versions to collect passwords from numerous applications.[2] |
| S0487 | Kessel |
Kessel has trojanized the |
| S0692 | SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can create a backdoor in KeePass using a malicious config file and in TortoiseSVN using a registry hook.[4] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1047 | Audit |
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended. Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones.[5] If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembly Cache directories to ensure that they are signed by Microsoft. Note that in some cases binaries may be catalog-signed, which may cause the file to appear unsigned when viewing file properties.[6] Periodically review for new and unknown network provider DLLs within the Registry ( |
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information. MFA can also be used to restrict access to cloud resources and APIs. |
| M1028 | Operating System Configuration |
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory ( Starting in Windows 11 22H2, the |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Ensure that |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [9] [10] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [11] Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying protected components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[6] |
| M1025 | Privileged Process Integrity |
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.[12] |
| M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Restrict write access to the |
| M1024 | Restrict Registry Permissions |
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0026 | Active Directory | Active Directory Object Modification |
Monitor for changes made to AD security settings related to MFA logon requirements, such as changes to Azure AD Conditional Access Policies or the registration of new MFA applications. Monitor for changes made to security settings related to Azure AD Conditional Access Policies. These can be found in the Azure AD audit log under the operation name Analytic 1 - Changes to AD security settings outside of normal maintenance windows.
|
| DS0015 | Application Log | Application Log Content |
Enable security auditing to collect logs from hybrid identity solutions. For example, monitor sign-ins to the Entra ID Application Proxy Connector, which are typically generated only when a new Pass Through Authentication (PTA) Agent is added. [5] If AD FS is in use, review the logs for event ID 501, which specifies all EKU attributes on a claim, and raise alerts on any values that are not configured in your environment.[6] Analytic 1 - Unexpected sign-ins or new PTA Agent additions.
|
| DS0025 | Cloud Service | Cloud Service Modification |
Monitor for changes made to conditional access policies used by SaaS identity providers and internal IaaS identity and access management systems. Analytic 1 - Changes to access policies without corresponding change requests.
|
| DS0022 | File | File Creation |
Monitor for suspicious additions to the Monitor for newly created files that may be used to register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs). Analytic 1 - Unauthorized file creation in critical directories.
|
| File Modification |
Monitor for suspicious modification of files associated with authentication processes, such as configuration files and module paths (e.g. Analytic 1 - Unauthorized modifications to authentication-related files.
|
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| DS0028 | Logon Session | Logon Session Creation |
Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.[15] Analytic 1 - Unusual logon patterns and times.
|
| DS0011 | Module | Module Load |
Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.[16] If AD FS is in use, monitor the AD FS server for the creation of DLLs as well as the loading of unrecognized or unsigned DLLs into the Analytic 1 - Unauthorized DLL loads in critical systems.
|
| DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
Monitor for calls to Monitor for abnormal API calls to Analytic 1 - Unauthorized API calls to manipulate lsass.exe or abnormal API calls
Analytic 2 - Unauthorized API calls to manipulate lsass.exe or abnormal API calls to NPLogonNotify().
|
| Process Access |
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. Analytic 1 - Unauthorized process interactions with authentication mechanisms.
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| DS0002 | User Account | User Account Authentication |
Monitor for account authentications in which MFA credentials are not provided by the user account to the authenticating entity. Analytic 1 - Windows Successful logons without MFA.
Analytic 2 - Linux Successful logons without MFA.
|
| User Account Modification |
Monitor for the enrollment of devices and user accounts with alternative security settings that do not require MFA credentials for successful logon. Analytic 1 - Unauthorized modification of user accounts Windows (User Account Modification)
Analytic 2 - macOS/Linux (User Account Modification)
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| DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Creation |
Monitor for the addition of network provider Registry keys (e.g., Analytic 1 - Unauthorized addition of network provider Registry keys.
|
| Windows Registry Key Modification |
Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: Monitor for changes to Registry entries for network providers (e.g., Analytic 1 - Unauthorized modifications to Registry entries for password filters or network providers.
Analytic 2 - Unauthorized modification of windows Registry keys may modify authentication mechanism
|